20 Jun 2016
Mr Chairman,
1 Let me begin by expressing our appreciation to Spain as Chair of the 1540 Committee, for convening these Open Consultations. We welcome the Committee's efforts to engage with Member States on an issue of critical importance.
2 The threat of proliferation is constantly evolving, and becoming more complicated by the threat of terrorism and illicit activities by non-state actors. Unfortunately, the threat of non-state actors gaining access to chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons is increasingly real.
3 Given the complexity and fluidity of proliferation networks in today's world, no one country can deal with the threat of proliferation alone. This is especially so when we consider the devastating and potential trans-boundary impact of weapons of mass destruction.
4 It is therefore imperative that we work towards closer international cooperation, and timely that we undertake this review of Resolution 1540.
5 Let me briefly outline what Singapore has done thus far at the national level to implement 1540.
6 First, we have set out a legislative framework to give full effect to Security Council resolutions through our United Nations Act. We regularly review and update our export controls lists to ensure that our system is in line with international practice. Our Schedule to the Strategic Goods (Control) Order 2015 is regularly updated, and incorporates elements of the Wassenaar Arrangement's Munitions List, and the European Union's List of Dual-Use Items.
7 Our Strategic Goods (Control) Act also prescribes a "catch-all" provision where all goods and technology intended or likely to be used for WMD purposes can be subject to controls. Singapore's financial sector supervisors regularly inspect our Financial Institutions to ensure compliance with our domestic Anti-Money Laundering/ Counter Financing of Terrorism Notices and Regulations. All persons in Singapore are required by law to report any suspicious transactions they come across, including those relating to targeted financial sanctions.
8 Second, Singapore adopts an integrated, "Whole-of-Government" approach. Counter-proliferation is often viewed as merely a security, defence, or military issue. However, it also comes under the purview of many civilian agencies, such as ports, customs, immigration, trade, and legal authorities.
9 Effective internal cooperation among agencies is essential for countries in the fight against proliferation.
10 In Singapore, our Inter-Ministry Committee on Export Controls acts as the policy coordination mechanism for the implementation of Security Council resolutions. This has helped to streamline and accelerate the implementation process. The Committee is chaired by a senior official at the rank of Permanent Secretary, who gives it high level attention and scrutiny, and ensures coordinated, timely, and effective action across the different Ministries and Agencies.
11 Third, Singapore undertakes outreach to engage all relevant stakeholders, including the private sector. In 2015, Singapore processed over 30 million TEUs. Our high shipping volumes reflect the complex operational challenges we face as a major port state and transhipment hub. Engaging the private sector enhances our counter proliferation efforts.
12 We conduct regular outreach programmes to ensure that the Singapore business and shipping communities are aware of the latest developments and requirements with which they have to comply. This is to ensure that they do not inadvertently contravene strategic goods control regulations as a result of ignorance or complacency.
13 Fourth, as a global financial hub, Singapore also adopts a rigorous approach aimed at preventing illicit funds and assets from entering our financial system.
14 The Monetary Authority of Singapore provides timely updates on changes to sanctions lists, as well as guidance on how to strengthen controls to prevent proliferation financing.
15 Financial institutions and non-financial gatekeepers are regularly subject to review to ensure the proper implementation of controls necessary to prevent proliferation financing as part of their compliance obligations.
16 Our agencies approach firms when they receive intelligence of suspected proliferation financing activities. The successful prosecution of Chinpo Shipping shows that we are able to take firm and decisive action when faced with reasonable grounds for suspicion.
17 Apart from implementing Resolution 1540 and submitting regular reports to the Committee, Singapore has also taken other actions to comprehensively and effectively implement other country-specific resolutions issued by the Security Council.
18 Singapore stands by our national record in successful implementation of Security Council resolutions on non-proliferation. However, we recognise that our actions do not take place in a vacuum. It is important to see our national actions as part of the wider, international counter-proliferation regime.
19 This is why Singapore continues to support regional efforts to build capacity and strengthen collaboration in counter-proliferation.
20 We participate actively at ASEAN Regional Forum Meetings, and other regional seminars on export controls and non-proliferation. We continue to work with the European Union’s Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Centre of Excellence in Southeast Asia on its projects and activities.
21 Singapore participates as well in the Proliferation Security Initiative or PSI, which aims to promote international cooperation in the global effort to combat the illicit trafficking of WMD. We have hosted two PSI exercises to date, and will host a third exercise in September this year. We are the only Southeast Asian member of the PSI Operational Experts Group, and the first Asian country to host a Group Meeting in July 2006. We will host the next Group Meeting in 2017.
22 Beyond this, Singapore has signed and ratified the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention. We have voluntarily submitted an annual declaration to the BWC Implementation Support Unit since 2012. We also submit an annual declaration of national programmes for protective purposes to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.
23 Although Singapore does not have significant nuclear material or facilities, we have participated in the Nuclear Security Summit process since its inception. In September, we are expected to serve on the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Board of Governors for the fifth time.
Mr Chairman,
24 The international counter-proliferation regime is only as strong as its weakest link. Singapore sees securing the global supply chain as a collective responsibility, and we are firmly committed to playing our part. My delegation looks forward to fully supporting your efforts during this important process, and we look forward to a fruitful exchange of views between all sides that will inform our collective approach in the period ahead.
25 Thank you.
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