Transcript of Speech by Senior Minister of State, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Home Affairs Sim Ann at the Debate on the Motion of Thanks to the President, 23 September 2025

Mr Deputy Speaker,

1 I rise in support of the Motion.

2 I will speak on how our foreign policy is adapting to geopolitical shifts and the growing presence of foreign interference and how Singapore can remain vigilant against it.

3 As noted by previous speakers, the global economic and strategic order is indeed shifting.

4 As a small, open and trade-dependent country, Singapore is especially sensitised to these shifts.

5 Let me briefly elaborate on some of the key geopolitical trends affecting us.

Geopolitical trends affecting Singapore

6 First, great power contestation between the US and China is intensifying. The Asia-Pacific region has become a primary arena of their contestation which spans trade, security, ideology, and technology. The South China Sea is an example of how tensions between major powers could have direct implications for peace and prosperity in our neighbourhood.

7 Second, geopolitical conflicts weigh heavily on the international system. Some wars continue unresolved and are difficult to end, while others have been re-kindled in recent times. They have resulted in immense humanitarian suffering and generated strong emotional resonance in many countries, including ours. Such conflicts have also delayed or impaired decision-making at regional or international groupings, making cooperation more difficult.

8 Third, nationalism and protectionism are on the rise. Countries are taking a narrower and more transactional view of their national interests. Declining strategic trust between countries has also led to increased contestation. We are seeing the fragmentation of global trade and technology ecosystems, export controls on sensitive technologies, and competing standards in areas like AI.

9 Consequently, multilateralism and rules-based international trade are under considerable strain.

10 These trends are keenly felt by Singapore, an open economy and global business hub. Whose security and prosperity have been boosted in the post-war era by favourable conditions such as an extended period of relative peace in Southeast Asia, a rules-based international order largely shaped by US leadership, and China’s success in reform and opening up. We now face greater risks, narrowed room for manoeuvre, and sharpened trade-offs in our foreign policy decisions.

Our foreign policy response: more continuity than change

11 In the face of these geopolitical shifts, it would be natural to wonder whether Singapore’s foreign policy should change significantly.

12 But in fact, Singaporeans can expect to see more continuity rather than change in our foreign policy. And this is because we have never taken for granted favourable global and regional conditions. We took pains to develop a diversified diplomatic strategy, just we have built a diversified economy MFA has invested as much effort and energy into advancing Singapore’s contributions at multilateral fora and regional groupings, as we have in maintaining bilateral accounts with partner countries which together constitute a broad geographical spread. We have also remained consistent in being a trusted friend and honest broker to our partners. Adding value wherever we can but also accepting the limitations of being a small country.

13 While there will be some adjustments to our diplomacy, these will not be abrupt shifts. Let me elaborate.

Expanding international partnerships and networks

14 Mr Deputy Speaker, we are doubling down on existing international partnerships and networks at the core of this effort is ensuring that our relationships with our closest neighbours — Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei — remain strong, wide-ranging, and forward-looking. We have embarked on long-term projects to enhance connectivity and strengthen economic and people-to-people ties, such as the Johor-Singapore Special Economic Zone (SEZ) and the Rapid Transit System (RTS) Link. We will also expand our partnership into emerging areas like renewable energy and human capital development.

a.      ASEAN remains a cornerstone of our foreign policy. Deeper economic integration within ASEAN remains vital to unlocking the vast potential of our region. We will work towards this by upgrading and fully implementing our trade agreements, deepening cross-border digital frameworks, developing the ASEAN Power Grid, and advancing green economy standards. We will also expand ASEAN’s network of partnerships, ensure key international players have a stake in our region’s success, and maintain an open, inclusive, and ASEAN-centred regional architecture. Singapore’s upcoming chairmanship of ASEAN in 2027, which coincides with ASEAN’s 60th anniversary, will be an important opportunity for us to help amplify ASEAN’s voice, effectiveness and relevance globally

b.      We have built strong relations with major powers over the years and will continue to do so. The US is our top trading partner in services, and our largest foreign investor. We are also the US’ only Major Security Cooperation Partner. China is our top trading partner in goods, and we are China’s largest foreign investor. Our bilateral interactions with China are multi-tiered, led by the Joint Council for Bilateral Cooperation (JCBC) at the DPM level, and comprising 3 G-to-G projects and 8 province-level economic councils. We see much potential to advance mutually beneficial bilateral cooperation between Singapore and the US, and between Singapore and China, in multiple areas. However, the space for us to do more together would narrow if US-China contestation were to escalate. We must remain clear-eyed and have the resolve to make decisions that are in Singapore’s long-term national interest.

c.      We have also been deepening strategic relationships with other partners, such as Japan, the ROK, India, the European Union, Australia and New Zealand. We have strong economic and security cooperation with Japan and the ROK, as well as a like-minded approach towards free trade. I look forward to the upgrading of our relations with the ROK to a Strategic Partnership next month. With India, we upgraded relations to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and are working to expand collaboration in forward-looking areas such as digitalisation, connectivity, advanced manufacturing, fintech and space. With the European Union, our FTA and the latest Digital Trade Agreement have given Singapore businesses preferential access to one of the world’s largest markets, while our cooperation in sustainability and green transition opens up new areas of growth. As we embark on the next round of our Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with Australia, we are exploring initiatives with a regional focus, as well as collaborations in frontier areas like critical technologies and space. With New Zealand, we are upgrading our Enhanced Partnership to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with significant initiatives across the defence, trade and economic, and supply chain and connectivity pillars

15 By anchoring trusted partnerships across different regions, we will: reduce our exposure to volatility, such as supply chain disruptions and strengthen our national resilience in key domains such as defence, energy, and technology and continue to serve as a “safe deposit box” not just for capital but also technologies and innovation, and be a trusted and secure node in the global network, where ideas, data and partnerships are protected, nurtured and scaled

16 Singapore has also been building new partnerships and networks with countries in emerging regions of growth such as Africa, Central Asia, the Middle East, and South America to avail our companies of new opportunities and partnership, and nurture coalitions among the like-minded to pursue shared objectives. We are planning to open new diplomatic missions in Africa and Latin America in the coming years.

17 In addition, through our Development Partnerships Directorate, MFA will enhance the Singapore Cooperation Programme, or “SCP” for short, to share Singapore’s experience and best practices in areas where we have relevant strengths. This is part of our diplomatic toolkit to deepen relationships with partners.

18 And when humanitarian crises strike, we will contribute where we can and seek to deliver practical assistance to alleviate the immense civilian suffering and displacement. We have done so when a magnitude 7.7 earthquake struck central Myanmar in March 2025 and are providing ongoing aid to the civilians in Gaza, something that we discussed in this house yesterday.

Supporting cooperation at the multilateral level

19 The rules-based international order may be under strain but many countries still believe there is more to be gained from cooperation than contestation, and that like-minded partners can continue to cooperate, on initiatives like digital economy agreements, green economy partnerships, and global governance initiatives, albeit on a smaller scale and, we are among them.

20 This is why we will do our utmost to support multilateral institutions, enhance international law, contribute to global governance discussions and promote peaceful dispute resolution.

21 We contribute actively to the development of global norms by leading groupings like the Forum of Small States and the Global Governance Group, to discuss issues facing small states, and to champion practical cooperation on issues such as respect for international law, climate change adaptation, and digital transformation. Singapore’s chairmanship of the Open-Ended Working Group on Cybersecurity at the United Nations (UN) from 2021 to 2025 led to the establishment of a UN Global Mechanism on Cybersecurity. The Agreement on Marine Biodiversity in Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ), successfully concluded under the leadership of Ambassador Rena Lee as President of the Intergovernmental Conference, has just crossed the threshold of 60 state ratifications and will soon enter into force. Singapore has also made contributions to the World Intellectual Property Office (WIPO) Treaty on Intellectual Property, Genetic Resources and Associated Traditional Knowledge, and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, particularly the development of carbon markets.

22 Singapore will also continue taking up leadership roles in international bodies where we have significant expertise. For example at the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), International Maritime Organization (IMO), Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND), and WIPO. To this end the Singapore Government has nominated Ambassador for International Law Rena Lee as a candidate for Judge on the International Court of Justice (ICJ); and Mr Daren Tang for re-election as Director-General of WIPO, with both elections taking place in 2026.

Foreign interference and hybrid threats

23 Mr Deputy Speaker, I turn now to foreign interference and hybrid threats, an increasingly prominent feature in this contested global landscape.

24 To be sure, countries have long interfered in other countries’ domestic politics, overtly or covertly to advance their own interests. This is not new.

25 What is new is the landscape in which foreign actors conduct these operations. The ubiquitous digital environment and development of advanced digital tools have supercharged their ability to mount hostile information campaigns (HICs) to advance their interests. By exploiting the internet, digital and social media, foreign actors can mount HICs at scale, speed and precision. Colleagues may have heard of the “Sprinter” network, a complex web of fake accounts that spread disinformation on the war in Ukraine, manipulated public opinion and amplified politically charged content. There is even disinformation-for-hire: In 2023, the Guardian uncovered a team of contractors that conduct disinformation operations for private companies, intelligence agencies and political campaigns.

26 With a diverse population that is highly digitally connected, Singapore is an attractive and vulnerable target. Last July, MHA had to issue Account Restriction Directions under the Foreign Interference (Countermeasures) Act (FICA) to block a network of social media accounts alleging that Singapore was in the pocket of a foreign actor, and that the foreign actor was behind the selection of Singapore’s fourth generation leader. The network could have been used to mount other HICs against Singapore. In October 2024, the Government blocked 10 websites set up by foreign actors masquerading as Singapore websites, including by using AI to generate content with local features.

27 At the same time, traditional methods of interference continue apace, through local and influential proxies. In 2024, the US arrested and charged a former CIA analyst for allegedly acting as an agent for a foreign country while an Australian court convicted a businessman for secretly attempting to improperly influence an Australian federal minister through donations, in order to advance the aims of a foreign power.

28 Singapore is not immune to these examples of interference.

29 MHA has therefore taken preventive measures, one of which was to define persons who are directly involved in Singapore’s political processes, including Members of Parliament, and designating several other individuals, as Politically Significant Persons under FICA. Transparency requirements and reporting are imposed on these individuals.

30 Foreign interference tactics will evolve and grow in sophistication. They touch on our everyday lives – through what we see, hear and read in an increasingly permeable infospace. Our defences must therefore grow stronger too.

31 To this end, MHA plans to amend FICA to update and strengthen our levers to address foreign interference threats.

Strengthen domestic support for foreign policy

32 Mr Deputy Speaker, foreign interference aims to weaken the targeted country, for instance by sowing division and internal strife.

33 It could also aim to influence the targeted country’s policies, including its foreign policy.

34 Vigilance against foreign interference is therefore a shared concern of Governments and foreign policy circles throughout the world.

35 But this does not mean that we discourage the public from learning about and discussing foreign policy.

36  On the contrary, we would like Singaporeans to continue being interested in and knowledgeable about global affairs, because it affects our security and prosperity. MFA is stepping up engagement efforts with domestic audiences, including students, youths and businesses, through closed-door dialogue sessions and workshops to help Singaporeans better understand Singapore’s operating context and foreign policy considerations.

37 Even as we consume and exchange views on foreign policy, let us remain alert to the possibility of external attempts to influence our foreign policy by shaping our people’s perception of it, and support for it. Through manipulating public sentiments, including through local opinion leaders, in addition to spreading misinformation and fake news.

38 We encourage Singaporeans to be discerning about the news and messages we are constantly receiving, including on social media, from a wide variety of sources. Always question what you see, hear or read – ask where the information came from; is it true and what is the intent?

39 I would like to share a few scenarios where it would be particularly useful for Singaporeans to exercise more vigilance and remind others to do so too. First is where discussions grow emotional. Inflamed sentiments can hamper judgment and create rifts between groups of Singaporeans that are hard to repair, especially if topics like race and religion are involved. Let us maintain calm and mutual respect when discussing current affairs, including global developments. Second, is where discussions centre around which countries Singapore should be closer to, or which countries’ lead Singapore should be following. Such chatter, though not uncommon, does not reflect how Singapore conducts our foreign policy. Those who find themselves in such conversations could gently remind their friends and associates that Singapore bases our foreign policy on our national interests. Third, is where leaders of local institutions and groupings or those with a following, find themselves commenting publicly on international developments. In such instances, it would be useful to consider the content carefully beforehand, and check if it can be construed to mean anything other than the view of a Singaporean who is well-versed in Singapore’s national interests.

40 Mr Deputy Speaker, over the past weekend, I spoke to a group of mostly young people who attended a workshop that unpacks how foreign actors might seek to interfere in another nation’s policies against that nation’s interests. I was heartened that they were so keen to know more about Singapore’s approach to foreign policy, supportive of the need to safeguard Singapore’s autonomy and agency in a complex world. Through more of such engagements, I hope that youths and community leaders can spread the word in their own circles.

41 Mr Deputy Speaker, foreign policy starts at home; we have repeated this many times in Parliament because it is not an abstract slogan, but a vital shield. Singapore’s relevance to the world depends on our ability to create value. We can be reliable and trusted by other countries only if we remain principled and consistent. We can only achieve this if we speak with one united voice. This stems from domestic stability as well as public trust in the Government. If our social fabric frays, our international credibility will weaken. Malignant actors may seek to exploit our divisions for their own interests. Support for our foreign policy does not mean unconditional agreement with all decisions, but a shared commitment among Singaporeans to safeguarding Singapore’s sovereignty and long-term interests. National unity and domestic support allow our leaders to stand firm under external pressure, to say “no” when it matters most, and to negotiate confidently on behalf of all Singaporeans to protect and advance our interests.

42 The Government will continue to do its part, through legislation, broadening education, and regular engagements with different segments of society to raise awareness and understanding of our foreign policy considerations and Singapore’s global contributions.

43 But more crucially, we must, as a nation and as a people, be alive to attempts by foreign actors to interfere in our politics, policies, and way of life. Legislative levers can only do so much, and they are often brought into play only ex-post. The ultimate line of defence against foreign interference is an aware and discerning people.

44 Mr Deputy Speaker, in Mandarin please.

45 副议长先生, 国际秩序日趋被削弱，世界也不太平。在这种情形下，我们更有必要防范外来干预和混合型威胁。

[English Translation: Mr Deputy Speaker, the international order is being weakened day-by-day, the world is also not very peaceful. Under such circumstances, we need to guard against foreign interference and hybrid threats.]

46 内政部计划更新《防止外来干预（对应措施）法令》，以加强我国应对外来干预的能力。

[English Translation: The Ministry of Home Affairs plans to amend the Foreign Inteference (Countermeasures) Act (FICA) to strengthen our levers to address foreign interference threats.]

47 外来干预的多种目的当中，除了左右目标国的政局，削弱目标国的内部团结，也可能包括影响目标国的外交政策。

[English Translation: There are many objectives for conducting foreign interference. Foreign interference aims to weaken the targeted country, for instance by sowing division and internal strife. It could also aim to influence the targeted country’s policies, including its foreign policy.]

48 因此，各国政府和外交人员对外来干预都有所警惕。

[English Translation: Vigilance against foreign interference is therefore a shared concern of Governments and foreign policy circles throughout the world.]

49 但这并不表示我们不鼓励国人积极了解国际动态、谈论外交政策。

[English Translation: But this does not mean that we discourage Singaporeans from learning about international developments and discussing foreign policy.]

50 相反地，我们希望国人关心国际局势，并对其具有一定的认识，因为这深刻地影响我国的安全与繁荣。

[English Translation: On the contrary, we would like Singaporeans to continue being interested in and knowledgeable about global affairs, because it affects our security and prosperity.]

51 因此，外交部会增加与国人的互动，包括学生、青少年、企业界等，帮助国人更好地掌握新加坡面临的国际形势，让他们更熟悉我们的外交政策。

[English Translation: Therefore, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is stepping up engagement efforts with Singaporeans, including students, youths and businesses, to help them better understand Singapore’s operating context and foreign policy considerations.]

52 国人在接触、讨论外交相关的话题时，也需要了解，外来势力有可能借机影响国人对国际局势的认知，进而改变国人对新加坡外交政策的看法与支持。具体作业方式可能包括利用意见领袖之类的人士操纵本地舆情、散播假信息等。

[English Translation: Even as Singaporeans consume and exchange views on foreign policy, we need to remain alert to the possibility of external attempts to influence our people’s understanding of international developments and change their perception of, and support for Singapore’s foreign policy. This could be done through manipulating public sentiments, including through local opinion leaders, as well as spreading misinformation and fake news.]

53 我们鼓励国人在接获来自四面八方、包括社交媒体平台的信息时，留意来源、并对信息的真伪和立场有一定的警惕。

[English Translation: We encourage Singaporeans to be discerning about the news and messages we are constantly receiving, including on social media, from a wide variety of sources.]

54 有几个场景，是特别值得我们注意的。如果国人碰到这些情况，除了自己有所警惕，也可以提醒身边的朋友：

[English Translation: There are a few scenarios where it would be particularly useful for Singaporeans to exercise more vigilance. and remind others around them to do so too:]

（一）情绪过度激动的讨论，尤其是涉及种族、宗教等敏感课题时，有可能造成国人之间无法弥补的隔阂。大家在讨论时事，包括国际时事时，需要保持相互尊重和冷静。

[English Translation: First, where discussions grow emotional, inflamed sentiments can hamper judgment, and create rifts between groups of Singaporeans that are hard to repair, especially when sensitive topics such as race and religion are involved. Let us maintain calm and mutual respect when discussing  current affairs, including global developments.]

（二）有些涉及国际关系的讨论中，会出现“新加坡应该更贴近某某国或追随某某国”之类的说法。这种闲谈不算罕见，但并不能够反映新加坡外交决策的实况。要是国人听到这种说法，不妨温馨提醒发言者，新加坡的外交政策是以新加坡的国家利益为出发点。

[English Translation: Second, where discussions centre around which countries Singapore should be closer to, or which countries’ lead Singapore should follow. Such chatter, though not uncommon, does not reflect how Singapore conducts foreign policy. Those who find themselves in such conversations could gently remind the speakers that Singapore bases our foreign policy on our national interests.]

（三）社团、商团领袖或意见领袖有时会针对国际时事公开发表感想或分析。在这种情形下，发言者可以事先仔细考虑内容，看看体现出来的观点是否属于一个充分掌握新加坡国家利益的新加坡人。

[English Translation: Third, where leaders of local social and business institutions comment publicly on international developments. In such instances, it would be useful to consider the content carefully beforehand and check if it can be construed to mean anything other than the views of a Singaporean well-versed in Singapore’s national interests.]

55 副议长先生, “外交始于国内”这句话不是抽象的标语，而代表了对新加坡至关重要的防护盾。

[English Translation: Mr Deputy Speaker, “Foreign policy starts at home” is not an abstract slogan but represents a vital shield for Singapore.]

56 新加坡如果希望继续享有其他国家的信任和友谊，就必须保持言行一致，坚持原则。我国社会的稳定，以及政府与人民之间的互信，允许我们在国际上展现团结坚定的姿态。

[English Translation: Singapore can be reliable and trusted by other countries only if we remain principled and consistent. We can only achieve this if we speak with one united voice. This stems from domestic stability as well as public trust in the Government.]

57 如果我们的社会出现裂痕，我们在国际上的信誉可能会遭受打击。恶意者也可能趁虚而入，而达到他们的目标。

[English Translation: If our social fabric frays, our international credibility will weaken. Malignant actors may seek to exploit our divisions for their own interests.]

58 支持我国外交政策，并不意味着国人必须赞同政府的每项外交决策，而是同意共同捍卫新加坡的主权和我国长远的国家利益。

[English Translation: Support for our foreign policy does not mean unconditional agreement with all foreign policy decisions, but a shared commitment to safeguard Singapore’s sovereignty and long-term national interests.]

59 有了这种共识，我国领袖就有底气在面对外来压力时站稳立场，在必要的关键时刻勇于说“不”，并且代表所有新加坡公民在国际谈判中从容、自信地为我国争取权利。

[English Translation: National unity and domestic support allow our leaders to to stand firm under external pressure, to say “no” when it matters most, and to negotiate confidently on behalf of all Singaporeans to protect and advance our interests.]

Conclusion

60 Mr Deputy Speaker, we are facing uncertain times, but Singapore has never been fatalistic. We have agency.

61 We have succeeded by staying united at home, relevant abroad, and nimble in adapting to change.

62 I believe that with the trust and support of our people, we can continue to secure a better global future for Singapore and Singaporeans.

63 Mr Deputy Speaker, I support the Motion.

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