Transcript of Q & A with Foreign Minister George Yeo at Foreign Correspondents' Association (FCA) Lunch Talk, Conrad Hotel, Singapore, 24 Jun 2005

Q (John Burton, Financial Times): One of the traditional aims of Singapore's foreign policy has been balancing China and the US and I believe you are now negotiating closer defence ties or strategic agreement with the US. I am wondering if that carries the danger of upsetting that balance in the sense that we could see an increased US military presence in Singapore, and as you know Singapore occupies the entrance into the Straits of Malacca through which a lot of China's oil supply comes through. I mean do you see any danger of the Chinese reacting quite negatively to that.

A: It is in the interest of Singapore and of Southeast Asia as a whole to have all the major powers having strong interests in the region's integration, development and prosperity. It is not in our interest, not in the interest of Singapore or of ASEAN or of the major powers, to see Southeast Asia divided and Balkanised, and I believe the major powers are all aware of this. When in response to China's offer for a free trade agreement in the year 2000, a framework agreement was signed two years later in Phnom Penh, Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji said that China did not seek for itself an exclusive position in Southeast Asia.

In other words, China recognised that the other powers had legitimate interests in Southeast Asia. Equally, I don't see the US wanting to exclude China or India from Southeast Asia. And recently, when a senior Chinese official was in the US, he said quite candidly that China did not seek to exclude the US from East Asia not even in the military sense.

So, provided we keep these forces in harmony and in balance, I believe we optimise the position of Singapore and we optimise the position of ASEAN as a whole. Our sea lanes should be open to ships, our economy should welcome investment from all quarters, our trade should be in all directions. If you watch Singapore's moves in liberalising trade, we are omni-directional. And I have said before that our best strategy, both for Singapore and for ASEAN, is to be "completely promiscuous" in our relationships.

Q (Roberto Coloma, AFP): I have 2 questions. Myanmar is a big problem for ASEAN now. Number 1 - Do think it was a mistake for ASEAN to admit Myanmar as a full member in 1997? Number 2 - How do you see the chairmanship issue coming up next month in Vientiane?

A: At that time, when Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia were admitted into ASEAN, Singapore's position was that it might be premature because their economies were still not sufficiently opened up. But, in the event, other members of ASEAN felt strongly that we should complete the ASEAN construction quickly. So we went along. Prime Minister Mahathir was one of those who supported it strongly. He expressed some words of regret subsequently, but it is no point dwelling back on the history. We work on the basis of where we are today. The issue of Myanmar's ASEAN chairmanship next year was fully discussed when the Foreign Ministers met in Cebu in April this year. I expect that there would be some follow-up discussion when we meet again in Vientiane next month.

Q: Is it being left up to Myanmar to declare next month whether to go ahead with taking the chair?

A: We took a clear position that it would set a very bad precedent for ASEAN to take away the chairmanship from any member.

Q (Weng Dong Hui, China Economic Daily): Just to follow upon Financial Times question about the Singapore-China-America triangular relationship. As you know, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong visited China last year and discussed the relationship. Recently, some experts in China were wondering whether or not Singapore is getting too close to the US. My question is, how is Singapore managing its relationship with China and the US?

A: For you to even talk about the Singapore-China-US triangle is fantastical. The US and China are big powers, we are a little city state. So we don't see the possibility of such an architecture with Singapore at one corner.

On any issue of importance to the big powers, small countries are subject to multiple pulls and pressures. For example, on the issue of the UN Security Council reform, all of us in SEA are being intensively lobbied by the major protagonists. If we try to please one side or the other, in the end we please nobody, so we always take the position that we act in Singapore's own national interests and for the long term. On UN Security Council enlargement, what's our interest? Our interest is to have a Security Council which reflects contemporary realities, which means for us, including Japan and India. But we are against the new member having the veto. It is very clear to us that having 11 vetoes will be a disaster for the UN. I am not sure if this position pleases either Japan or China, but this is our position.

In the same way, when it was clear that US ships and aeroplanes would not be welcome in Clarke and Subic, Singapore offered facilities to the US Navy and Air force. That was in 1989. I made the announcement to the Singapore Parliament as Deputy FM. We did that because we believed that the continued presence of the US military in this region was important to us for a variety of strategic reasons and we continue to hold that position.

Is China unhappy with this position? Well, Chinese leaders have been asked and they always said that this is the legacy of history and they work with it. So I would say, in the end every country calculates its own national interests and what we must do in Singapore is to be very clear about where our own core interests lie, and stick to them.

Q (inaudible): Clearly, Singapore wants to be seen now as a global city (inaudible) but I would like to have an update on this "sinicization" programme that we have been having for years. Has it been dropped for a decade of two now, the idea of making Singapore more Chinese with former SM's Confucian values?

A: I find that remark a little strange. But I can understand why from certain perspectives we might be seen to be becoming more Chinese. However, from other perspectives, we might be seen to be becoming more Indian or Middle Eastern. Next week, my Prime Minister is going to India to sign a Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement. And, if you followed the Asia-Middle East Dialogue we had in the last few days, some people were wondering why we were brandishing our Middle Eastern links. Then, the week before, we had the visit by the Foreign Minister of the Vatican. He was here to open with me the Vatican's biggest exhibition in Asia ever at the Asian Civilisations Museum, where we celebrated our Christian heritage.

Singapore is like a crystal with many facets and depending on the conditions of light and the angle you view it, it might glitter in a different way. The important part of what it means to be Singapore is to be multi-faceted and to reflect the world in all its complexities within ourselves. It is this ability to reflect a much larger world around us that enables us to operate the economy that we are now operating. Without this capability, without these many cuts which make up Singapore, we are just another pebble on the beach.

Q (Suryanarayana Sadasiva, The Hindu):

A: You are going to ask us why we are becoming more Indian? (laughter)

Q: The East Asia Summit, at the moment seems to be, at least to India, primarily economic in orientation. Do you intend to give it a strategic and political dimension as well? And the second question, inevitably, is something to do with India. Would Singapore vote for the G4 resolution in the UNGA and the Security Council?

A: We have worked very hard for stronger links between India and Southeast Asia. We have deep links with India. From 1819 to 1867, Singapore, under the East India Company, was governed directly from Calcutta. It was only after the Indian mutiny and the reform of the East India Company that we became a Crown Colony, reporting directly to London afterwards. But even so, our laws, our administrative procedures, our professional standards, all came from India. After the war, because India embarked on the road of Socialism, we parted ways.

Then Narashima Rao took India down a different turning in 1991. Once we came to the conclusion that India was serious and the new policy was irreversible, we positioned Singapore for India's liberalisation. It took a long time, there were many twists and turns, but in the end, I believe we were proved right. So hence CECA, hence the ASEAN-Indian connection, hence the East-Asia Summit.

If we cast our eyes to Asia 10, 20, 30 years from now, I believe that it will be a return to the past, of traders and scholars and religious leaders and adventurers travelling all along the coast from east to west and from west to east, which means without sharp interruptions, a continuum from the Middle East through the subcontinent into Southeast Asia all the way up to East Asia.

If you look at it from the view point of connectivity - air links, sea links, road links, rail links, electronic links - the Asia which was carved out by the western powers will no longer be. Instead, it will be an Asia which would be like earlier historical periods. It would not be a unified Asia, because there is still South Asia, there is still Southeast Asia, there is still East Asia. But there will be much more too-ing and fro-ing. It is that world of an integrated Asia which we are envisaging, it was that world which created Singapore and we believe it is that world which will re-sustain Singapore in the 21st century, which is why we are so eager to help bring it about.

Now, as to your question about whether we would support the G4. I have received demarches from the G4 and I have told them that on the issue of the veto, the ambiguous language saying that for 15 years the G4 will not exercise its veto, that's not acceptable to us. Therefore, we cannot co-sponsor such a resolution. If that framework agreement, unaltered, goes to a final vote in the UN, we will have to sit down carefully and decide how we will vote. But we will not abstain, we will take a position because it is important to us to have a clear stand.

Q (Junichi Fukasawa, Yomuri Shimbun): With regard to the debacle regarding Straits Times correspondent Mr Ching Cheong, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has issued a statement saying that the issue has nothing to do with the Singapore Government. It would appear that the Singapore Government didn't help in appealing for his release.

A: I can't remember the actual words that we put out. He is not a Singaporean, he is a Permanent Resident. He works for the Straits Times. We don't have the full facts of the case. If we are asked by the family to provide some consular facilities, we will do so, because we extend that facility to all permanent residents. Are we able to comment on the justification for the Chinese detention of him? We don't have the full facts and we are not in a position to comment, one way or the other. And as he is not a citizen of Singapore there are limits to what we can do, unless we are actually asked by the family to do something for him. That's our position.

Q. You have not been asked?

A: We have not been asked. I believe we have been in communication with the family, but they have decided not to ask us for any assistance.

Q (Geert De Clercq, Reuters): I just want to go back to this question on Myanmar. You spoke about the matter in Cebu and you will discuss it once again in Laos. Is there any contact in between these meetings that gives you the impression that there won't be any progression in the Myanmar position. You yourself said in a recent editorial in the Financial Times you thought it would be a good idea if Myanmar withdrew. The Thai Foreign Minister said this week that it would be a good solution. Drawing from that, I wonder if there is any progress on this.

A: No, I did not say that. What I said was when we were at Cebu, we discussed the subject in an intimate family setting. We said publicly that we would not take the chairmanship away from Myanmar. Myanmar had told us, as it has to other countries in Southeast Asia, that it would not be selfish and that it would take into account the interests of ASEAN as whole. So, in the Financial Times, I said that the Foreign Ministers of ASEAN took that to mean that Myanmar would, might, withdraw on its own from assuming the chair.

Q (De Clercq): There was also some news flashing on CNA yesterday saying that Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice will not be going to Laos because of US reservations about the Myanmar issue. Have you heard anything about this?

A: No, I don't think that's the reason. I believe that she may send to the Laos meeting, Deputy Secretary Bob Zoellick, who knows the region very well, who is a close personal friend and whom I think will be very able to represent the US at the meeting.

Q: It's not a snub to ASEAN?

A: Oh no, I don't think so. Why should the US snub us on this issue? It is for the US to express its views on Myanmar, that's fair enough. Why should the US not engage ASEAN? There are so many others issues, much more important, that have got to be discussed.

Sonia, President, FCA: On behalf of the FCA I would like to thank the Minister for taking the time to come today and I have a small token to present to you. Thank you very much.

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Prepared by: Public Affairs Directorate
Date: 24 June 2005