Transcript of Minister Dr Vivian Balakrishnan’s Interview for CNA's “US-Singapore Relations At 55” Documentary

Jaime Ho (Chief Editor, CNA Digital): Minister Vivian Balakrishnan, thank you for speaking with us. 

Minister: You are most welcome. 

Ho: Our conversation today is going to focus primarily on Singapore's relations with the United States and it is because you have a visit close on the horizon – (United States) Vice President Kamala Harris. It is going to be a big visit. Singapore has also had recently (United States) Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin as well. The Biden Administration has also nominated an Ambassador here, after a couple of years without an Ambassador. Would you say then that relations are now on a different track – a more familiar track for you?

Minister: Well, I would say that relations have always been on track. I think it is worth emphasising the point that through successive Administrations – both Democrats and Republicans – we have actually had excellent relations with them and let me just give you a few data points. You will remember that PM Lee (Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong) was invited by President (Barack) Obama to a State Dinner. I think that was in August 2016. In 2017, President (Donald) Trump invited PM Lee for an Official Visit. I remember we stayed in Blair House again. In 2018, President Trump was here for the Trump-Kim Summit. The year after, PM (Lee) paid a working visit. I remember him and President Trump signing the 2019 Protocol of Amendment to the (1990) MOU Regarding United States Use of Facilities in Singapore. There has been a steady tempo of meetings and interactions, but clearly COVID-19 upended all that. Whilst it is true that we have had video conferences and phone calls, to be honest with you, diplomacy does need face-to-face interactions. You need to look into people’s eyes. You need to have some time, sometimes, just to relax and have a one-on-one conversation. Coming back to the visit by Vice President Kamala Harris – it is a very welcome and important visit. It is in fact, her first visit to Asia. I think everyone is looking forward to meeting her in person and to renew the agenda and engagement in the years going forward.

Ho: Her first visit outside of the US was to Mexico and Guatemala, and people expected that. You can see the reasons behind it. Now she has chosen Vietnam and Singapore. What do you make of their decision to come to Asia, and Southeast Asia as a first stop for her?

Minister: Well, if you look at the pattern of the Biden Administration's diplomacy, in a sense, it is a bit more conventional. They try to engage multilaterally. They engage quite systematically with their allies, their partners, and other stakeholders. I think it is quite in keeping with that tone and that pace for her to reach out to Southeast Asia and in particular Singapore. We are a city-state right in the heart of Southeast Asia. Vietnam (is) another emerging mid-size major country in Southeast Asia. I am sure she will be covering other parts of the world in due time.

Ho: I am sure you, your colleagues in Cabinet, and in the Government have quite long ties with President (Joe) Biden himself. 

Minister: Yes.

Ho: Both as Vice President for eight years and then in the Senate and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 

Minister: Yes. 

Ho: Give us a sense a little bit more, you had mentioned a bit of that, on his vision of foreign policy and where Asia fits into it.

Minister: Well, you are absolutely right. President Biden is someone who does not need any tutorials in foreign policy. He is completely familiar with it. But beyond just (the) subject matter, I think the point is that – now I recall my first meeting with him, this was again in August 2016, for the State Dinner – he comes across completely friendly, relaxed, avuncular, perhaps. He recalled his meetings with the former Prime Minister, Mr Lee Kuan Yew. He remembered his visit to Adam Road Hawker Centre. At a personal level, he is really very personable, very engaging, and very charming. He puts a brilliant, smiling face, to the American diplomacy.

Ho: I wanted to jump on a point that you made just now about the more traditional approach, including towards things like multilateralism. If we look back on the previous Administration and the approach that they took on issues ranging from the WTO (World Trade Organization) to the WHO (World Health Organization) to the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, Singapore has always cooperated quite deeply with the United States on issues like multilateralism. Was it a challenge for you then, and therefore, do you look forward to these coming years with the Biden Administration with something different?

Minister: Well, let me let me put it this way. I think President Trump was an unconventional President. He did things and said things his way; it was his unique trademark. But I think it is also important to understand what President Trump represented. There has been a change in global circumstances and a change in US domestic body politic. He, in a sense, epitomised the anxiety and the concern of a very significant segment of the American domestic political opinion. So, it is important to situate his pronouncements and his actions in that light. 

Let us take a step back. After the end of the Second World War, the real clear winner was the United States. It was 40 percent of the global GDP (Gross Domestic Product). The United States established, or was a key founder, of a variety of multilateral institutions –the United Nations, the IMF (International Monetary Fund), the World Bank, the WTO, and the WHO for that matter. It underwrote a multilateral system based on rules, based on a belief in free trade, free economy, free flow of investments and the growth of multinationals. In a sense, it envisioned, underwrote, and implemented this rules-based global multilateral system that we all have taken almost for granted for seven decades. It is worth making the point that this has been a recipe for peace and prosperity, and especially for us in Singapore (and) in Southeast Asia. If you look at it at a global level – in Asia, China has also been the biggest winner of this multilateral system with free trade, flow of investments, access, and engagement. That is where it started. But (if) you fast forward 50, 60 years from that time, the United States now is about a quarter of global GDP. It is still big, but it is not the big behemoth that it used to be. The nature of a multilateral rules-based system is that everybody, big or small, sometimes you will win, sometimes you lose. When there is a case (which) goes for arbitration, or a case (which) goes for dispute before an international court, you win some and you lose some. 

Next point is that the rise of China has presented the United States with an unprecedented peer power. Meaning, one that is almost as strong, almost as big and has similar depths of technological expertise. This is a contest which America has never faced. If you go back to the Cold War and the USSR – the Soviet Union – yes, there was a Cold War, yes, there was an ideological battle, and yes, there were proxy wars. But in terms of economy, in terms of technological breadth and depth, it was an unequal challenge. Now for the first time, it is facing, I believe, a peer competitor, and then you add the domestic elements within the United States; people's anxieties, especially in the Rust Belt, about globalisation, about free trade, about competition, so you end up with a rather complicated and sometimes volatile mix, which has resulted in a rather polarised America. 

Therefore, coming back to Singapore's perspective, we have to take the world as it is. We see a transition from a unipolar world to a multipolar world. We see domestically all over the world, including in Singapore, a political reaction against globalisation and unfettered free trade. In fact, we also witness that it is hard to completely encapsulate or insulate free trade from politics and sometimes people start getting worried if you are overly dependent on one or the other, and that economic account becomes a means to apply political  pressure, so there is a geostrategic element as well. You add all this up, we understand, in a sense, what is going on in the United States. We understand that polarisation makes it difficult for the United States to present, sometimes, a consistent narrative through different Administrations. But I think we just have to learn to adapt, and this is par for the course. Coming back to the question of consistency and bipartisanship, I would say from a Singapore perspective, in terms of engagement, in terms of actual policy implementation, in terms of our economic account, our defence account and our diplomatic engagement diary, it has been very good and it has been consistent.

Ho:You raised many issues and I will get to them – from China to their own domestic polarisation. Given all that, as the larger context, are you confident at least that in these remaining three years and a few months, this Biden Administration can push things a little bit along, especially on the economic, trade front, whether it is bilaterally with Singapore or even multilaterally or plurilateral, that they can get back a little bit on track as far as openness and maybe even globalisation, given especially domestic issues. Is that doable?

Minister: Well, they have got a lot on their plate. But at least if you listen to their pronouncements, they have said they believe in multilateralism, (and) a rules-based world order. They announced that they are back in the saddle as far as the Paris Agreement is concerned. They are engaging both at multilateral fora as well as bilaterally with all the important and key stakeholders and allies. Singapore is not a formal ally of the United States. We are in a rather unique category, a group of one, called the Major Security Cooperation Partner. Part of the reason for that is that Singapore as a matter of policy does not have formal alliances. But we do believe that America has been a constructive, significant presence and a significant pillar of the formula for peace and prosperity in Southeast Asia. 

America remains the largest foreign investor in Singapore. In fact, this was a statistic I used to regularly remind President Trump (of), that America has more invested in Singapore – I think that number is about  US$315 billion – America has more invested in Singapore than it has invested in India, China and (Republic of) Korea combined. Many people are often surprised at that. There are more than five thousand American companies here. All of them have been doing well. They have been a conduit for technology, for networks, for trade and for access. So, again, if you look at the actual numbers, it has done very well. If you look in terms of trade agreements, you might recall that the US-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, began with a midnight golf game between then-Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong and then-President (Bill) Clinton. Subsequently, Mr Goh and President Bush signed it in 2003. In 2004, it came into effect. Since then, our trade with the United States has doubled. America remains our third largest trading partner. In fact, America is our largest trading partner in terms of services. If you look both in terms of jobs in Singapore as well as jobs in the United States, which are directly or indirectly related to this economic account, there is no question (that) this is a vital and growing account which sometimes I think people do not give enough credit to.

Ho: That is precisely one of the very interesting things about (our) country's economic relations and foreign direct investment ties with the US. You have companies, whether it is ExxonMobil, whether it is Google, whether it is Facebook, whether it is Amazon, whether it is Coca-Cola, these are big names that people sort of instinctively know as global brands but not necessarily as American brands. In a strange way, it has not added to the US’ public diplomacy, so to speak. Do you agree that therefore it is intrinsically more difficult for people to understand the depth of the relationship, even in the US itself? As you say, some people do not even know how big the account is.

Minister: That is true. Part of the reason is (that) in the United States, there is a thriving corporate business sector which makes decisions on the basis of its own business interests, and shareholders’ interests. It is not part of the political or state machinery. This is actually a good thing. It is a good thing that when you are dealing with a multinational (corporation), you know that you are going to make decisions on the basis of business and not on the basis of politics. This is a design feature of the American system, and I am saying that it is a good thing, but it often leads to the point where people underestimate the importance of the American corporate sector. In the case of Singapore, if you go back in time, Hewlett-Packard, Texas Instruments, National Semiconductor, they were here in the 70s. That is why in the 80s, Singapore was a world leading producer of electronics. These were the vanguard of our electronics industry. Then you fast forward to today, all the big guys – Google, Amazon, Netflix – they all have data centres or engineering centres here, (and their) regional headquarters here; huge chunks of (their) digital infrastructure and data centres are all here. Again, you see the economic logic has been there and the fact that Singapore is an attractive place for investments. If you recall, even last year, EDB (Economic Development Board) reported record investments here. Another example of significant investment is GlobalFoundries. They make wafers – semiconductors – and they have just put in S$5.4 billion (in investment), (and) it will create at least 1000 high-end jobs. It will be producing, I would expect, something like 1.5 million semiconductor wafers per year. The point is (that) American companies were a big part of our industrialisation story. They continue to be a major investor and source of technology as we transit into the digital age. People have not noticed, but it is worth emphasising.

Ho: I am sure you talk to all of them individually, but you also talk to them at the level of the US Chamber of Commerce, the AmCham here, the US-ASEAN Business Council. Do you think they sometimes feel people do not understand enough whether it is in the US Administration, in the United States as well as in Singapore? What is the sense that you get from them?

Minister: The other (Singapore Cabinet) ministers and I interact regularly with them. I think they are not short of attention from us. They know that we understand and appreciate their critical role in our economy. We do make the point to them that they often need to embark on more domestic campaigning in America, back home and especially in Washington D.C. and in the halls of the Capitol.

Ho: I want to now talk about defence ties. You alluded to that. It has always been deep; it has sometimes been complicated and it obviously has been sensitive. It is quite foundational; you have the 1990 MOU which obviously has been renewed. Give us a sense of how, in 1990, when you signed the MOU with the United States, what were the considerations in terms of setting the stage that we are strong partners, but – as you said – we are not allies. The US would say we are a place, not a base. 

Minister: Yes.

Ho: How has that changed? How has the situation changed strategically between 1990 and now? You have mentioned China as well, but I am sure regionally and strategically, things may have added on the plus side and on maybe on the minus side in adding to the complication of how you deepen these defence ties.

Minister: Well, I would characterise it as a plus – in fact plus plus. I would go back in time when we became independent in 1965. A key design choice that we had to make, and even within the PAP (People’s Action Party), was not to be communist, but to open ourselves up to the world, to attract investments, to have industrial peace, to be able to export to new markets and to be able to bring in new technologies. If you go back to the 60s, you would recall that we were still in the throes of the Cold War and you could divide the world into communist, or communist-leaning on one side, (and) free market open economies on the other side. We were clearly in the latter camp. I often remind my American colleagues that whatever their views now about the wars in Indochina, (the) American sacrifice of blood and treasure in the 60s and 70s bought us time and space to prove that our economic model worked, and we were a success, and we were a beneficiary of that. The point I am making is that American involvement (and) engagement in this part of the world – economic – and then with the economy, also having military interests to protect the economy was actually part of the regional architecture that coalesced or formed in the 60s and the 70s. 

Then, of course, (there was) the significant large wave of American investments into Southeast Asia and a large, very big chunk of that (was) in Singapore. When the Cold War ended in the late 80s and the Philippines decided that they wanted the Americans to leave Clark and Subic – if you have been to Clark and Subic, you know how large they are – there is no way that Singapore could ever be a substitute for that. Nevertheless, Mr Lee Kuan Yew was categorical that America should not disengage from Southeast Asia despite the fact that the Cold War had ended. That is why this concept of “places, not bases” came about. That is why the Memorandum of Understanding in 1990 came about. Over the years, the American Navy has become the largest foreign user of Changi Naval Base. Now, the other story, which we do not usually emphasise, but everyone knows – we all serve National Service – is that in terms of our equipment, defence technology, we use quite a lot of American technology. I would characterise that, beyond just using tools, it is a question of trust. Another factoid or another index of trust is if I was to ask you – I often ask the Americans – which foreign country has more troops training on American soil than even NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) countries. The answer, surprisingly, is Singapore. That is because it gives us space, gives us opportunities to (conduct) high-(end) and realistic training. The result of that is very close institutional and personal links between our leaders, including military leadership and theirs, and I would say a very large reservoir of trust and goodwill.

Ho: I am going to use that concept of trust to talk about newer areas of cooperation and there are quite a few areas of cooperation there. But I will start with technology where trust is going to be a key factor, a key metric in how countries are able to push forward in bilateral cooperation. In terms of technology, there are some who will say that, effectively we are moving towards a bifurcated, decoupled global arena. The US on one side and potentially China on one side, and how far you can go with either one will depend a lot on trust because one side may have limitations and constraints about how you may want to work with another side. Do you foresee that to be something to be concerned about, or do you think Singapore and other countries will still be able to find a balance in pushing technology cooperation forward?

Minister: That is a very complicated question. Let us start with this question of competition. Again, if you go back in time, the transistor was invented in the United States. The computer was invented there, the personal computer, the Internet was invented there, e-commerce, (and) new ways of communication (like) video conferencing (was also invented there). We start with a world where as I said, both economically and technologically, it was basically unipolar. America was number one. America was the inventor. America was the investor, (and) the disseminator of technology. The rest of us were in a catch-up, adopt, and then try to make our mark on the scene. If you take that historically, China was also a beneficiary of that access to technology, that access to markets and as a receptacle for investments for FDI, including FDI from America. 

So your question then is what has changed? What has changed is that as we transit to a multipolar world and as China is no longer just catching up but has every intention and ambition of overtaking where it can, at least in certain sectors, you now have real peer competition. It is about understanding that these are unprecedented times. In the past, the Americans would say, do not worry, you know, we will compete, may the best man win. But today, there is no guarantee that the best man will always be American. Then the question arises – and this becomes a domestic question – does America have sufficient self-confidence that in a fair, rules-based contest, it will always prevail? Or will it accept that sometimes it may not win the gold medal in every race? The point I am making is that it is first and foremost a domestic question within America – of their own self-confidence. A more confident America can actually accommodate and make space for a peer competitor. Here is where things now get complicated. Because if the two superpowers can work out sufficient modus vivendi, rules of engagement, patterns and norms of behaviour so that they can compete, collaborate, contest even, and yet to do so within bounds that can build up a mutual experience that ultimately builds up trust from knowing that it is not just one race, but we are going to be sitting around the same table time after time, engaging, competing, pushing, persuading, cajoling – then that can be a start of another golden age in the digital arena. Because the cumulative weight of investment in contests and innovation will unlock a tremendous burst of creativity, innovation, and entrepreneurship – that is the golden scenario. The opposite scenario is that America believes it must win at all costs, that it must change the rules if need be, or (it) believes that China is getting ahead purely through unfair means – that immediately erodes trust. 

On the other side – and here I will speak from interacting with my Chinese counterparts – if they (China) believe that America is a declining power, and it is not only their time in the sun but that it is inevitable that they will win, we will also have a problem. I have tried to convince my Chinese friends to not count America out. America's population may be one quarter of China’s, but America's ability to attract the top talent from all over the world means (that) the base of the American pyramid is actually far far broader and deeper than China’s. So, do not count them out. As Winston Churchill said, the Americans will do the right thing after they have tried everything else. But my sense of it right now, from my years engaging the Americans in Washington (D.C.), Capitol, and in Beijing and other places, is that on the American side, there is bipartisan suspicion, lack of trust and anxiety with China. On China's side, China also worries that America is not taking a benign and collegial approach to them. All this talk of bifurcation, of economic sanctions, (and) of denial of access to technology, I worry that we will end up with a self-fulfilling cycle where trust is depleted, bifurcation of supply chains occurs, which in turn leads to a bifurcation of technology, which must mean a world with slower progress. The rate of technological advancement will be disrupted and then it will pose a problem for countries like us.

Ho: You point to the scenarios that are possible when the two countries are able to focus and cooperate despite competition. Automatically, the thing that comes to mind is obviously climate change under the Obama Administration where, despite competition, at least leading up to 2015, they were able to work together towards the Paris agreement at that stage in time. Obviously, it has been a difficult four years since then, but do you think it is possible to move that now forward with the Biden Administration?

Minister:On climate change, let me give you a very personal take. I spent four years of my life, a lot of that time, as a Ministerial facilitator for round after round of negotiations that led to the Paris Agreement. Let me tell you up close – (the) Paris (Agreement) would not have occurred without, ultimately, the confluence and congruence of the United States and China. I knew both the Special Envoys at a personal level very well, and I can tell you (that) without that duet between America and China, the Paris Agreement would not have occurred. You have just seen the latest IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) report. It is not amber lights; it is red lights, and we are likely to crack past the 1.5 ℃ threshold by 2030. If in the next three years we cannot get America and China in the same room, sitting at the same table and doing what needs to be done for our planet, we are all in deep trouble. There is an absolutely urgent need. What I am saying is there is a potential glorious golden age if the two of them can work together. There is an urgent, existential threat in climate change, which again requires the two of them to get together. 

And for what it is worth, now I will speak from a purely Singapore perspective. Singapore, where America is more invested than it is in India, China and (the Republic of) Korea combined, where the American trading account and technology account is so big, but also, Singapore, (where) our biggest trading partner is China, and Singapore (who) is the largest foreign investor in China. Can you see why we dearly want the two of them to get together? 

Of course, your question then is you can wish that, but you cannot make that happen, and I think what you are actually pushing me to say is what are you going to do when things do not go according to plan? I will put it to you this way. For Singapore and our foreign policy, the existential imperative that Mr Lee Kuan Yew has always emphasised to us is relevance. We must make ourselves relevant, so that others have a stake in our success and will want us to continue succeeding. If you look into how we have actually implemented this dictum of relevance we have been relevant to the Americans; to their economic interests, and to their defence and strategic engagement of Asia. We have been relevant to China; you look at our Government-to-Government projects, our investments, and the fact that we are now the largest foreign investor in China. If you look at Chinese companies also establishing regional or global headquarters or expanding even their digital footprints and the digital infrastructure – we have been relevant. The point is, they all know that we have been useful and that we have been relevant. 

But there is a difference between being useful and being made use of. You see that distinction? I am very clear in all my interactions – and a lot of this is behind the scenes – that we will demonstrate relevance, we will be useful, but we will not be made used of. We will not become one or the other's stalking horse to advance negative agendas. Now, this is a difficult position to take because it means I do not have the luxury of saying different things to the Americans on one hand and the Chinese on the other. I say exactly the same thing, consistently. I also make it clear that we are not taking sides, but we will take positions depending on the issue – whether it is climate change, digital economy, cybersecurity, pandemics. Singapore will take positions on issues according to our calculations on what is in our long-term national interests. But you are aware, as I am, that because Singapore is deemed to be a relevant, useful, stakeholder –  almost like a reference customer – it does mean our people are subject to quite a lot of information and persuasion campaigns which come through social media (and) come through messaging platforms. This is something which Singaporeans need to be aware of. The fact that they are trying to persuade us is actually good. It shows that we are relevant. But always bear in mind (that) we are a multiracial city-state where trade is three times our GDP, (located) in the heart of Southeast Asia. We are relevant to both the United States, China, and Southeast Asia, and we will stay relevant only as long as we can maintain our independence (and) our space to pursue our own long-term enlightened national interest. Do not take sides, take positions on issues. This has been a challenge. It will be probably a greater challenge in the years ahead. But that is where I need Singaporeans to understand the forces, the communications, the campaigns that are run, and to have an open mind.

Ho: To start capping off then and to use that as a segue – what comes to mind is a recent Pew Centre study on perceptions. It would appear – and this is purely a snapshot, obviously – but it would appear that in this snapshot, Singaporeans tend to have more favourable dispositions towards China as compared to the United States. When you look at studies like that, how does it concern you? What is it that you hope for? Do you hope that Singaporeans, as you say, keep an open mind, find some sort of balance? But again, depending on the situation, the balance may tilt in either way, depending on the issue as well. What is your main takeaway when you see something like that? You have already spoken about the depth of the relationship with the United States. Is that something that you feel that sometimes is underestimated or diffused in the public perception?

Minister: I think our relationship with America tends to be underestimated both by the American public and the Singapore public. But setting that aside, what I hope for is a Singaporean public that is well-informed, that understands the geostrategic forces that are playing out in this time and space, (that) understands our own national interests and (that) we do not inadvertently get sucked into other people's propaganda or other people's agendas. It requires confidence, information and an unblinkered view of our interests and of our future. In other words, like I said, do not take sides, take positions on whatever the issue is. Let us look at the facts, look at the data, and look at the evidence. From time to time, sometimes you will have to say this is right, that is wrong, or we support this, or we do not support that. Coming back to the polls – polls are a snapshot of sentiment at a point in time, which is often affected by multiple factors, including the most proximate experience. Right now, for instance, the world is still in the grips of a pandemic. Lives have been lost, (and) lives remain threatened. I think what people are looking for all over the world right now is good governance. Forget the labels of communist, non-communist, and all the debate about political forms. People just want good governance, meaning do you have a leadership that understands what is going on and understands the risks and the opportunities, that is able to communicate and explain and mobilise people to deal with clear and present dangers. I think that is what people are looking for – hungering for right now.

Ho: As a final question and to talk a little bit more, therefore about, as you are suggesting, the domestic situation here in Singapore. To use a quote from former Speaker of the US House (of Representatives), Tip O'Neill, obviously meant this in a different way, but all politics is local. I would say that, foreign policy also ultimately is formed by local factors. As you see developments in Singapore and we were talking about this, do you think it has made your foreign policy a bit more complicated, a bit more difficult, especially as it relates to relations with a big country like the United States and China, but maybe the United States for this conversation?

Minister: Well, my take on it and I have repeatedly reminded my colleagues here, foreign policy begins at home. You first need to have a people united by an idea, a concept, a mission. In the case of us (Singapore), we just celebrated 56 years (of independence). We are a multi-racial city-state where all of us are equal, where with our backs to the wall, we have succeeded, and we have got something to protect. Because we have got something to protect, and because we have an identity, and we have citizenship and we have a passport. Without all that, there is no foreign policy to pursue. Next point is because we have been reasonably successful so far in these 56 years, people take us somewhat seriously. Because they know we are successful and united, and when the Prime Minister says something, it will stick, it matters, it is implemented, and it is done. That actually makes it so much easier for our diplomats, and for me, knowing that we come from a place (where) people have heard of us, there is a brand name, (where) we are united, we are coherent, and we are consistent. If you ask me to compare it to diplomacy 56 years ago, I would say we have it much easier, because we have a successful, thriving, and united Singapore. So it begins at home. Now, having said that, because we are now in uncharted territory with the rise of China and the fact that America remains by a significant extent a leading superpower, and because of our unique position at that interface, we stand to gain so much opportunity, if they get along well, and there is a new set of challenges for us (if they do not). All I ask of our own people is to keep our eyes wide open, take the world as it is, (and) understand what is going on. As I said, we will be useful, but we will not be made use of.

If we have that confidence, that wherewithal, that verve, the next few years will be exciting (and) exhilarating. It is a very good time to be alive. It is a good time to be Singaporean. The challenges that are going to unfold both domestically and globally will be great, especially for our young generation. Just imagine a world in which we will be leaders in the use of new digital technologies, of AI (artificial intelligence), of robotics, of new means of communication. Imagine a world where we are going to solve climate change with our green plan and our ability to adopt quickly and use new technologies. Imagine a world where trust is the most important currency and the Singaporean reputation for good old-fashioned reliability, honesty, integrity, combined with imagination – think again of those opportunities for us. You know all these things keep me awake at night, but it is born out of excitement and exhilaration, not fear and paranoia.

Ho: Well, on that very positive note, we all hope it comes to pass. Thank you very much, Minister Balakrishnan, and good luck on the visit by the Vice President.

Minister: Thank you, thank you. We are looking forward to that too.